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The Sources of Investment Income in Emerging Markets Economies 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Changes in a country’s current account balance are often assumed to reflect fluctuations 
in its net exports. However, the current account also includes net primary (foreign) income and 
net secondary (transfers) income. Net primary income comprises payments for productive 
resources, and usually consists mainly of income on investments. These income flows have 
grown in size since the expansion of financial globalization in the 1990s. Forbes, Hjortsoe and 
Nenova (2017) have pointed out that primary income now represents a larger share of the current 
account than the trade balance in several emerging market economies such as Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Indonesia, and Mexico. In some cases, the two sub-balances have moved in different 
directions, with primary income deficits partially offsetting trade account surpluses.	 
 Net investment income reflects several factors, including a country’s net international 
investment position (NIIP) as a creditor or debtor nation, the composition of its external assets 
and liabilities and their returns. The foreign exchange assets of central banks in emerging market 
countries, particularly in Asia, increased in the 1990s and 2000s. Moreover, during this period 
the emerging market economies increasingly turned to equity, particularly foreign direct 
investment (FDI), as an external source of finance. As a result, their equity liabilities grew 
steadily. The resulting external balance sheet profile is known as “long debt, short equity,” and 
differs from the “long equity, short debt” composition of the balance sheets of advanced 
economies that hold equity and issue debt.    
 In non-crisis periods, the equity issued by emerging markets should yield a return that 
compensates its holders for the riskiness of these liabilities. This would normally exceed the 
return that the emerging markets earn on their foreign exchange, held in the form of U.S. 
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Treasury securities and other debt assets. Consequently, we would expect that those emerging 
market countries with the “long debt, short equity” composition of their balance sheets to record 
deficits in their investment income balances due to the differences between the earnings of their 
reserve and debt assets and the payments on their equity liabilities. China, for example, records 
deficits on its net international income balance despite its status as a creditor nation. 
 This paper investigates the trends in international investment income and its determinants 
in 26 emerging market countries during the period of 1995-2015. We examine the components of 
investment income—net FDI income, net income from portfolio investments, net income from 
other investments, and reserve income—to determine how they have contributed to the overall 
movement in investment income in these countries. We also analyze which factors affect these 
income flows. We specifically examine the impact of capital account and trade openness, as well 
as the effects of domestic financial development and governance on the income flows. 
 Our results indicate that emerging markets recorded net international investment income 
deficits of 2-3% of GDP over this period. These deficits reflect primarily the deficits on net 
foreign direct investment income. There is also a small deficit on net portfolio investment. The 
deficit on net income from other investments, on the other hand, has fallen over this period, 
while the return on reserve assets is very small.  
 The determinants of these income flows differ according to their sources. Openness of the 
capital account and trade both contribute to net direct investment income deficits. Financial 
development and investor protection, on the other hand, have impacts on the income from 
portfolio investments. The development of domestic financial institutions and markets lowers the 
payments on these investments, while a robust legal system and investor protection raises them.  
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Our study, therefore, contributes to our understanding of the income flows associated 
with external assets and liabilities. It is the first to focus on emerging market economies and also 
the first to examine the separate components of investment income. The results are relevant for 
an understanding of the dynamics of the external positions of these economies. As stated above, 
net investment income has become a significant component of the current account. It is also part 
of the adjustment mechanism between current account balances and the NIIP, and plays a role in 
the international risk-sharing of consumption. If FDI continues to serve as a major source of 
external finance for these countries, then the associated payments will continue to be a 
significant component of investment income and the current account.  
 In the next section, we review the existing analyses of this subject. In Section 3 we 
explain the data used in the empirical analysis, and examine the trends in international income 
flows and its components. Section 4 presents the results of empirical analyses of these 
movements. The final section summarizes the findings and explores their implications. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Relatively few studies have focused on international investment income flows. 
Langhammer (2012) showed that many emerging and developing economies have net income 
deficits that partially offset their trade and transfer surpluses. Strauss (2016), for example, 
described the role of FDI income payments in South Africa’s current account deficit. Akkermans 
(2017) examined net profit flows from FDI. 
Forbes, Hjortsoe and Nenova (2017) demonstrated how investment income flows affect a 
country’s current account, and developed a model of the impact of domestic and global risk on 
investment income. They point out that a country’s investment income will depend in part on the 
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composition of its external assets and liabilities as well as its NIIP. Bond (1977) provided an 
econometric analysis of investment income inflows and outflows in Germany, the United 
Kingdom and the U.S. for the period of 1962 through 1975.  
The returns on external assets and liabilities are part of the adjustment mechanism to an 
external imbalance. This process also includes valuation effects, which are based on exchange 
rates and asset prices, as well as changes in the trade balance. Studies of the relative magnitudes 
of these components include those of Adler and Garcia-Macia (2018), Alberola, Estrada and 
Viani (2018), Gourinchas and Rey (2007) and Habib (2010). 
The transformation in the composition of the external balance sheets of developing and 
emerging market economies has been examined by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007, 2018) and 
Kose and Prasad (2010). The share of the liabilities issued by these countries in the form of debt 
peaked in the mid-1980s and then fell as the share of equity—primarily FDI—rose. The increase 
in equity liabilities coincided with an increase in external assets held as debt and foreign 
exchange reserves (primarily U.S. Treasury bonds) on the balance sheets of many emerging 
markets. In recent years, however, emerging markets have also been a source of FDI (Sauvant, 
McAllister and Maschek 2010). 
Lane (2013) has claimed that this composition of external assets and liabilities acted as a 
stabilizing buffer for the emerging market economies during the global financial crisis as their 
NIIPs benefitted from the fall in value of their equity liabilities. Joyce (2018) has shown that the 
countries that were net issuers of FDI had higher growth rates during the crisis, fewer bank crises 
and were less likely to borrow from the IMF.  
The advanced countries that held the equity assets found that they lost value during the 
crisis. This latter phenomenon was accentuated in the U.S. because of the appreciation of the 
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dollar at the beginning of the crisis. The assets denominated in foreign currencies suffered a 
further loss in value, while the dollar-denominated liabilities increased in value. This resulted in 
a wealth transfer between the U.S. and the emerging market countries during the global financial 
crisis, which helped buffer the effects of the crisis. 
Gourinchas, Rey and Govillot (2010) referred to this transfer as a form of “crisis 
insurance,” and the return paid on the equity liabilities as the price of this insurance paid to the 
U.S. and other holders of the liabilities. Gourinchas, Rey and Truempler (2012) have provided 
estimates of the value of the wealth transfers between the U.S. and other countries. Maggiori 
(2017) also investigated the U.S. role as a key country that holds the risky assets of other 
countries, on which it receives a higher return in compensation. 
Several theoretical models have been offered to explain the disparities in the financial 
systems of advanced and emerging countries, which account for the different compositions of 
their external balance sheets. Mendoza, Quadrini and Ríos-Rull (2009), for example, presented a 
model in which countries differ by the degree of their enforcement of financial contracts. 
Residents of countries with better security provisions invest in the high-return but relatively risky 
equity issued by countries with less developed financial markets, which in turn hold the debt 
issued by the countries with more developed financial markets.  
Ju and Wei (2010) compare developed countries with efficient financial systems and 
strong property rights with emerging market economies that have weak financial systems and 
intermediate levels of property rights. In their model, the latter countries export financial capital 
but are net issuers of FDI. Wei (2006) in an empirical analysis of the composition of external 
liabilities found that financial development boosted the issuance of portfolio equity and 
discouraged FDI. Joyce (2019) also reported that the development of domestic financial markets 
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is linked to an increase in the equity liabilities of emerging market economies, and in particular, 
portfolio equity, while FDI liabilities are more common when financial institutions are not well 
developed. 
Measures of financial development in both source and destination countries have been 
included in bilateral gravity models of capital flows. Portes and Rey (2005) reported that equity 
market capitalization in both economies increased equity inflows in the host country. Aggarwal, 
Kearney and Lucey (2012) included measures of host and home equity and bond market 
development in their analyses of foreign portfolio equity and debt investments. Bilir, Chor and 
Manova (2019) find that an improvement in financial conditions in a host country increases the 
number of foreign affiliates located there. 
Other bilateral studies have investigated the linkage of FDI and financial development. 
Donaubauer, Neumayer and Nunnenkamp (2016), for example, find that bilateral FDI increases 
with better developed financial markets in both the host and home countries. As one of the 
rationales for the latter linkage they point out that multinational firms are likely to finance their 
activities in the local markets. Similarly, Desbordes and Wei (2017) report that financial 
development in both the source and destination economies promotes FDI.  
Our work, therefore, extends the limited research done on international income flows. We 
also draw upon the literature on external assets and liabilities to investigate the associated 
income flows. We also incorporate lessons from the analysis of the impact of domestic financial 
development on the composition of foreign liabilities.  
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3. Data and Trends 
3.1 Data 
 In our empirical analysis, we examine the influence of the external assets and liabilities, 
global and domestic cyclical factors, trade and financial openness, domestic financial 
development and governance on the various investment income flows of 26 emerging market 
economies over the period of 1995 to 2015. The countries in the sample are Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, China, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jordan, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, 
South Korea, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela.1 Data sources are reported in Table 1 and the 
summary statistics are listed in Appendix I.  
 Our dependent variables are: a country’s net investment income scaled by GDP, which is 
then disaggregated to net direct investment income, net portfolio investment income, net income 
from other investments, and reserve income credits. We also look at the gross flows of credits 
and debits for all investment income and its components. The data on investment income are 
reported in the IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics. 
 We measure the impact on the income flows of their respective assets and liabilities. In 
the case of total investment credits and liabilities, we use a country’s net international investment 
position scaled by GDP (NIIP/GDP), and we then use as separate variables its external assets and 
liabilities, each also scaled by GDP. Similarly, in the following regressions we include net direct 
investment scaled by GDP, as well as direct investment assets and liabilities, similarly measured; 
net portfolio investment and portfolio assets and liabilities; net other investments and other 
investment assets and liabilities; and reserve assets scaled by GDP. The data for external assets 
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and liabilities are taken from the latest version of the “External Wealth of Nations” dataset (Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti 2007, 2018).  
 We use several measures of domestic economic conditions: GDP growth, the percentage 
change in the dollar exchange rate, and per capita GDP.2 Domestic growth may raise payments 
on liabilities. The impact of a change in the exchange rate is also not straightforward. A 
depreciation that increases exports would contribute to the profitability of domestic FDI and 
therefore profits; however, it could also have domestic consequences for income inflows. We 
also included a trend. 
 In addition, we sought to analyze how the openness of an economy influenced these 
flows. The period under study was marked by increased financial openness in many of the 
countries under study. Countries with more open capital accounts may be more likely to have 
larger investment income liabilities due to increased foreign investments and the ability to 
repatriate earnings. As a measurement of de jure financial openness we utilize the Chinn-Ito 
(2006) measure of capital account openness, which is based on the data reported in the IMF’s 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. Chinn and Ito constructed 
an index based on the data reported for each country. The original series was rescaled to 0-100, 
with higher values indicating more openness. Financial openness declined at the time of the 
1997-98 Asian crisis and then recovered, reaching its highest value in 2008 before subsequently 
falling in its wake. 
 We also include trade openness, as measured by exports and imports scaled by GDP. If 
foreign investments are targeted towards the traded goods sector, then a country with more trade 
may have more outward income payments. Trade openness also rose in the period preceding the 
global crisis before falling, but has recovered to its pre-crisis levels. 
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The literature cited in Section 2 has found evidence of linkages of domestic financial 
development and foreign investment, particularly FDI. For measures of domestic financial 
development, we make use of indexes developed at the IMF, which are designed to capture the 
multidimensional nature of the development of financial institutions, such as banks and 
insurance companies, and markets, including stock and bond markets. Financial development is 
assessed by depth, access, and efficiency.3 We use the data on the overall measure of financial 
development and also its two subcomponents of financial development: financial institutions and 
financial markets.4  We rescaled the variables to 0-100. We use these variables in the estimations 
to test whether countries with more financial development were more likely to register net 
income deficits or surpluses.  
 To examine the influence of governance we used two of the variables contained in the 
PRS Group’s International Country Risk Guide. The law and order measure assesses the strength 
and observance of the legal system. It ranges from 1 – 6 points, with higher ratings denoting a 
stronger legal system. A country’s investment profile takes into account contract viability, the 
repatriation of profits and delays in payments on a 12 point scale, with higher points showing 
less investment risk from these sources. 
 We used lagged values of the determinant variables to avoid endogeneity.5 Initial testing 
of the panel data indicated the existence of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the error 
terms. Therefore, we used linear regressions with panel-corrected standard errors where the 
parameters are obtained from Prais-Winsten regressions.6  We also included country fixed 
effects, which should capture the effect of many institutional variables, as well as yearly effects.7 
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3.2 Trends 
Figure 1 shows the averages for the countries in our sample of their direct investment 
assets, portfolio (equity and debt) assets, other (mainly bank-related) assets and reserves, all 
scaled by GDP.  At the beginning of the period external assets consisted primarily of other 
investment assets (13.7% of GDP) and reserve assets (13.5% of GDP). There was a rise in 
reserves over the period, and these peaked at 22.4% of GDP in 2009 before falling to 18.7% of 
GDP at the end. There was also a rise in other investment assets to 20.3% of GDP. But the 
largest increase was recorded by direct investment assets, which grew from 3.8% of GDP to 
23.3%, demonstrating that emerging markets have become a source of FDI. Portfolio investment 
assets also increased from 3.4% of GDP to 13.2%. 
Figure 2 illustrates the corresponding trends for external liabilities. The rise in direct 
investment liabilities is most striking, recording a fourfold increase from 19.3% of GDP to 
47.6%, almost half of all external liabilities. Portfolio liabilities increased from 11.6% of GDP to 
24.2%, but other types of liabilities fell as a proportion of GDP from 38.6% to 28.1%. 
Our data for the increase in FDI liabilities are consistent with those of the OECD (2016), 
which reported that FDI flows to non-OECD countries more than doubled between 2005 and 
2014. However, Blanchard and Acalin (2016) have pointed to a high correlation of FDI inflows 
and outflows for emerging market countries. They interpret this correspondence as evidence of 
flows through rather than to a country, possibly for tax reasons.8 Since FDI liabilities were 
double the amounts of assets in our sample, it would seem that most of the inflows were destined 
for these economies, but the data may overstate the amount of external finance available to them. 
We next look at the current account of these countries and its components in Figure 3. 
Net primary income has consistently been in deficit during the period, ranging from about 2-3% 
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of GDP. Net secondary income, on the other hand, shows a surplus of the same magnitude. For 
the countries in our sample these would reflect remittances by migrant workers to their home 
countries. The balance of trade is much more volatile, fluctuating since 1999 within a range of 
about +1 to -1.5% of GDP, rising during the early 2000s and right before the global financial 
crisis blast before declining. The fluctuations in the current account, therefore, follow those in 
the balance of trade because the primary and secondary income flows largely offset each other. 
The deficits in net primary income are predominantly due to net investment income, 
which registered a deficit that increased from 2% to 3% of GDP over the period. This figure is 
comparable to the investment income return of -1.7% of GDP for a sample of emerging market 
economies over the 1990-2015 period reported by Adler and Garcia-Macia (2018). These deficits 
are larger than those on net primary income, with the gap growing over the time period from 
approximately 0.2% of GDP to approximately 0.6%. The difference is accounted for by inflows 
of income from the other productive factors, such as wages received by domestic workers from 
foreign entities. 
In Figure 4, we separate net investment income into its components: net income from 
direct investments, net income from portfolio investments, net income from other investments 
and income from foreign reserve holdings. The figure shows that there has been a marked 
increase in the deficit on the income from direct investments. This deficit rose from 1.1% of 
GDP in 1998 to 3.1% before the crisis, before declining to approximately 2.5%.  During this time 
period net income from portfolio investments registered deficits of less than 1%. The deficits 
from other investments, which had been the largest component of the overall investment income 
deficit, has fallen in recent years below 0.2% of GDP. Finally, income from reserve holdings 
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showed an increase of about half a percentage point during the period leading up to the crisis but 
subsequently fell, and are now at the same level as they were at the beginning of the period. 
The correlations of total net investment income scaled by GP and its components confirm 
that the strongest positive relationship is that between the overall balance and that on direct 
investment income: 0.87. This is followed by the correlation with net portfolio income balance at 
0.28 and the correlation with income from other investments of 0.23. Income from reserves has a 
correlation of only 0.11. 9 
The investment income deficits registered by these emerging market economies, 
therefore, are largely a product of their direct investment liabilities. As these liabilities have 
grown, so have their payments. The payments may also involve profit shifting by multinationals 
that seek to record their profits in those jurisdictions with low corporate tax rates.10 
The FDI income debits include retained earnings as well as dividends. UNCTAD (2013) 
reported that since 2009 the share of reinvested earnings in total FDI payments has been the 
highest in developing countries, reaching 49% in 2011. Lundan (2006) and Strauss (2018) 
discuss some of the reasons why corporations may reinvest their earnings in the host country. 
These include the profitability of the local affiliate, as well as the tax treatment of profits in both 
the host and source countries.11 Hansen and Wagner (2018) point out that these profits can 
supplement national savings, and can be used to finance further FDI inflows. UNCTAD (2013) 
found that the share of reinvested earnings in financing inward FDI was the highest for 
developing economies at 36%. 
Net investment income flows for our sample, therefore, rose over the 1995-2015 period. 
Moreover, there has been a change in their composition, with payments on FDI now forming the 
largest part of the net income deficit. This rise is in part a result of the shift in the sources of 
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foreign finance for the emerging economies from bank and other forms of debt to FDI, and the 
resulting change in the composition of the external balance sheets of these countries. We explore 
below additional reasons for these fluctuations in these income flows. 
 
4. Results 
 4.1      Net Income 
Table 2 reports the results of the analysis of the determinants of total net investment 
income. Specification (2.1) shows that net income rises in response to an increase of one percent 
in a country’s NIIP/GDP by 0.02 of a percent of GDP. In specification (2.2) we replaced the 
NIIP with external assets and liabilities as separate variables, and these two variables have the 
expected positive and negative coefficients that are highly significant. 
We also added the openness and financial development variables in specification (2.2). 
Capital account openness has a negative coefficient in specification (2.2) that is significant at the 
10% level, and similar coefficients and levels of significance appear in the next two 
specifications. An increase in the Chinn-Ito index lowers net investment income by 0.01 of a 
percent of GDP. Trade openness also has a negative coefficient, which is significant at the 5% 
level here and in the following specification and at the 1% level in the last specification. An 
increase in trade openness by one percent of GDP lowers net income by 0.02 of a percent of 
GDP. We discuss these results below when reporting the results for direct investment income. 
The financial development measure has a positive coefficient that is significant only at 
the 10% level. The coefficients of its two components, the development of financial institutions 
and markets, are not significant in specifications (2.3) and (2.4). Similarly, when we add the two 
governance variables in specification (2.4), neither has a significant coefficient.  
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In Table 3, we investigate the determinants of net direct investment income. The net 
direct investment position in specification (3.1) has a positive and significant coefficient, with a 
point estimate of 0.03 that is higher than the value of 0.02 for NIIP/GDP in the preceding table. 
The coefficients of direct investment assets and liabilities in the following specifications have the 
expected positive and negative signs that are always highly significant, and values that are higher 
or equal to the corresponding variables in Table 2.  
Both capital account openness and trade openness increase the deficit in net direct 
investment income, and both sets of coefficients are significant at the 1% level. A one unit rise in 
the Chinn-Ito index lowers net income by 0.02 of a percent of GDP. The value of the coefficient 
of trade openness, -0.02, is the same as that reported in Table 2, -0.02. These results are 
consistent with a situation in which emerging market economies deregulated their capital 
accounts in order to allow multinational firms to establish domestic affiliates. The affiliated firms 
engage in trade and generate income for their parent firms. The increases in capital and trade 
openness in the period leading up to the financial crisis are consistent with the rise in the deficit 
in net income from direct investments up until 2008, and the relative lack of movement in 
openness since then is also consistent with the stable deficit of the last few years. 
The financial development variable has an insignificant coefficient in specification (3.2). 
When we replace it with its components in specification (3.3), neither is significant. Similarly, 
neither of the two governance variables have significant coefficients in specification (3.4). 
In Table 4 we investigate the determinants of net income from portfolio investments. The 
net position has the expected positive coefficient in specification (4.1), while portfolio income 
assets and liabilities have significant positive and negative effects on net income in specifications 
(4.2), (4.3) and (4.4).  
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The results for the determinant variables here are different from those for direct 
investment in the previous table. Capital account and trade openness, for example, are generally 
not significant, except at the 10% level in one specification each. This could indicate that the 
determinants of the returns on financial securities will differ from those on direct investments. 
Moreover, we aggregate the flows of income from portfolio equity and bonds, and they may also 
be influenced by different variables. 
The financial development variable has a positive and significant coefficient when 
introduced in specification (4.2). When the two subindexes of development are added, the 
development of financial markets has a positive coefficient that is significant at the 5% level in 
specifications (4.3) and (4.4). The development of these markets can affect net payments through 
the payments received or those paid out, and we further examine this linkage below.  
When we add the two domestic governance indicators in specification (4.4), both have 
negative coefficients. The coefficient for investor protection is significant at the 10% level. 
Payments on portfolio liabilities may be higher in emerging markets with more safeguards for 
foreign investors, and we also explore this below.  
In Table 5 we examine the determinants of net income from other investments. The net 
position has a positive and significant coefficient in specification (5.1), and other investment 
assets and liabilities have the expected positive and negative effects on this form of income in the 
remaining specifications. Their values are close in absolute values to those reported in Table 4. 
The income per capita variable has a negative coefficient that is statistically highly 
significant. An increase in income per capita of $1,000 lowers the income from other 
investments by -0.14 to -0.15 of a percent of GDP. Capital account openness, which had a 
negative coefficient in Table 3, has a positive but small impact on this form of income. A one 
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unit rise in the Chinn-Ito index raises income from other investments by 0.004 of a percent of 
GDP. In this case, a more open capital account may lead to more foreign investments that yield 
income. The financial development variables, on the other hand, and the governance variables 
are insignificant. 
We also investigated the impact of openness and financial development on the income 
received from foreign reserves. However, the number of observations—171—is much lower than 
those reported in previous tables. This is consistent with the policy of many central banks to 
report little information about their reserves, including their composition. 
An increase in reserves by one percent of GDP raises income payments by .01 of a 
percent of GDP. This is the smallest coefficient in absolute value in any of the results for the 
impact of a change in assets or liabilities on income, which is consistent with a low rate of return 
on the foreign exchange reserves. The GDP growth rate is linked to an increase in reserve 
income, as is income per capita. During the period leading up to the financial crisis, those 
emerging market economies that were growing rapidly built up their reserve positions. But the 
two types of openness do not seem to have an impact on reserve income, and neither does 
financial development.12 
The results for the disaggregated income flows demonstrate that they respond to different 
factors. The openness of an economy can lead to outflows of income from direct investments, 
but capital openness has the opposite effect on income from other sources. Financial 
development, which is not significant for direct investment flows, does affect income from 
portfolio investments 
. 
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4.2 Gross Flows 
To further explore these linkages, we also examined the gross flows of income credits 
and debits. In Table 6 we report the results for gross flows of credits from all investments 
(specification (6.1)), direct investments (specification (6.2)), portfolio investments (specification 
(6.3)) and other investments (6.4). Table 7 reports the corresponding results for gross flows of 
debits.  
Increases in the various assets yield more credits, with the highest value (0.04) obtained 
for the income credits of direct investments, consistent with the existence of an equity premium. 
Moreover, all these estimates are higher than the return earned on reserve assets. GDP per capita 
has positive and significant coefficients for all investment income, direct investment income and 
other investment income inflows in specifications (6.1), (6.2) and (6.4). Richer emerging markets 
may be more active in making foreign investments of these kinds.  
Capital openness is not significant in any of the estimating specifications. Trade openness 
has a negative and significant coefficient for all forms of income credits, but none of its 
components. More developed financial institutions are associated with lower portfolio income 
credits, possibly because domestic investors have less need of foreign securities when domestic 
markets have grown. The law and order variable has positive and significant coefficients in the 
specifications for all investment income as well as that derived from portfolio and other 
investments. A stable domestic environment may make its investors more willing to invest 
abroad. 
Table 7 repeats the analysis for investment income debits. As in the previous table, the 
coefficient associated with payments on direct investment liabilities—0.03—is higher than those 
on portfolio investments, further evidence of an FDI “premium.” Adler and Garcia-Macia (2018) 
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also interpret the higher return on the liabilities of emerging market economies as evidence of 
risk premia. 
Capital account and trade openness appear with positive coefficients in specifications 
(10.1) and (10.2), and the levels of significance rise for both variables in the specification for 
direct investment income debits. This is consistent with the hypothesis advanced above that 
foreign firms invest in operations in the host country that engage in international trade, and these 
lead to profits and income payments for those firms. Capital account openness, on the other 
hand, lowers the payments on other investment income.  
The effect of financial development on investment income takes place through portfolio 
income payments. The development of both financial institutions and markets lowers the 
payments on this form of liability. It may be that domestic financial development allows foreign 
investors to profit from capital gains as opposed to interest and dividends. On the other hand, 
both the legal system and investor safeguards increase income outflows, which lowers the net 
balance. Payments are more likely when there is a legal system that protects investors. Since we 
have aggregated the different forms of portfolio securities, it is not possible to determine whether 
payments on stocks or bonds are affected by these governance variables. 
The results for the gross flows, therefore, lend some additional insight into the previous 
results. Direct investment assets and liabilities yield returns that are higher or equal to those on 
other forms of foreign investment. Capital account and trade openness are associated with higher 
payments on direct investment liabilities. Financial development lower portfolio debits, while 
legal and investor safeguards increase them. 
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4.3 Rates of Return 
 The results for the impacts on income of a change in the net position or the amounts of 
external assets or liabilities indicate that the returns on the different investments vary. This is 
consistent with the existence of a premium for both the risk and reduced liquidity of direct 
investments. To test whether the return on equity assets and liabilities are higher than those on 
other forms of foreign capital, we reestimated the equations for gross income investment credits 
and debits from Tables 6 and 7 (specifications (6.1) and (7.1)) but using each of the components 
of the external assets and liabilities as a determinant, both singly and together.  
 In Table 8, the dependent variable is total investment income credits/GDP, and the 
measures of assets are direct investment assets/GDP in specifications (8.1) and (8.4), portfolio 
investment assets/GDP in specifications (8.2) and (8.4), and other investment assets/GDP in 
specifications (8.3) and (8.4). A comparison of the asset coefficients in specifications (8.1), (8.2) 
and (8.3) indicate that a one percent change in the asset yields similar returns in investment 
income for direct investment and portfolio assets, and these are larger than those for other 
investment assets. However, when we include all the assets in specification (8.4), the return on 
direct investment assets—0.04—is larger than those on the other assets.  
 We repeat the exercise for the impact of the different liabilities on investment income 
debits in Table 12. In this case the dependent variable is total investment income debits/GDP, 
and the liabilities are direct investment liabilities/GDP (specifications (9.1) and (9.4)), portfolio 
investment liabilities/GDP (specifications (9.2) and (9.4)) and other investment liabilities/GDP 
(specifications (9.3) and (9.4)). There is evidence of a direct investment “premium” in the first 
three specifications. The coefficient of direct investment liabilities in specification (9.1)—0.04—
is higher than the corresponding coefficients of 0.00 and 0.03 for portfolio and other investments 
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in specifications (9.2) and (9.3). When all the liabilities are included in specification (9.4), the 
impact of an increase in direct investment liabilities here of 0.03 is higher than that on portfolio 
income, -0.02, which is not significant, and equal to that on other investments.  
 The evidence shows that FDI assets and liabilities may have higher returns than other 
forms of foreign capital. This is consistent with the hypotheses of a premium on FDI outlined 
above. Moreover, the returns on all the liabilities are higher than that recorded on reserve assets 
(0.01), and explain why an external balance sheet composition that is “long reserves and debt, 
short equity” would result in investment income deficits. 
 
4.4 Robustness 
To examine the robustness of our results, we also estimated the main equations of interest 
using Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model. The different income flows could 
have error terms that are contemporaneously correlated. Under these circumstances, the use of 
the SUR method provides estimates that are more efficient than those obtained assuming 
independence of the error terms. 
Table 10 reports the results of the estimations of specifications (3.4), (4.4) and (5.4).  The 
R2s for the three specifications are higher than the corresponding R2s in the original estimates. 
For example, the R2 for the specification with Net Direct Investment Income/GDP as the 
dependent variable here is 0.75, while the corresponding R2 for specification (5.4) is 0.65. These 
results suggest that the error terms among the four equations are correlated. 
The coefficient values of the variables of interest are generally similar to those reported 
in Tables 3, 4 and 5. In specification (3.4), for example, the coefficients for capital and trade 
openness are -0.02 and -0.02, each significant at the 1% levels; in specification (10.1), the 
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corresponding values are also -0.02 and -0.02, and both are significant at the 1% level. Similarly, 
in specification (4.4), the coefficient for financial markets is 0.01, and it is significant at the 5% 
level; in specification (10.2), the coefficient is the same and the level of significance is 1%. But 
some results differ. GDP per capita has positive and significant coefficients in specifications 
(10.1) and (10.2); neither of these are significant in specification (3.4) or (4.4). 
Our results for the impact of openness and financial development on investment income, 
therefore, are confirmed by the SUR estimations. Capital and trade openness affect the deficit on 
FDI income, which is the main component of total investment income. The development of 
financial markets affects the flow of income on portfolio assets and liabilities. 
We also undertook estimations that included global variables, such as the world growth 
rate and the U. S. Treasury rate, but without the time fixed effects. The results for capital and 
trade openness and financial development were quite similar.  
We also examined whether our results changed if we excluded a country or a group of 
countries from the sample. Excluding China, for example, did not change the significance of 
capital account and trade openness for direct investment income or financial markets for 
portfolio investment income. Similarly, we excluded the East European and Baltic countries in 
our sample (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland), and their 
exclusion did not materially change our results for direct investment income. However, the 
significance of financial markets for portfolio income fell. Similarly, the exclusion of the Latin 
American nations (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela) did not 
change our findings. 
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5. Summary 
Our results demonstrate that the net international investment income component of the 
current accounts of emerging markets has consistently registered deficits in recent decades. 
However, the sources of the investment income deficits changed over the period of financial 
globalization in the 1990s and 2000s. The most recent deficits consist mainly of payments on 
foreign direct investments, which is consistent with the change in the composition of the external 
balance sheets of emerging market economies.  
Since the 1990s these countries increased their issuance of FDI liabilities while bank-
related liabilities fell. The payments on these equity liabilities are often larger than on other 
external liabilities, which reflects their greater risk and lesser liquidity. These payments can also 
be interpreted as representing an “insurance premium,” paid to equity holders in advanced 
economies who risk the loss of the value of the equity during a crisis.13 The countries in our 
sample make these payments in return for sharing the risk of an economic downturn with those 
who hold the FDI liabilities.   
The income payments on FDI liabilities of the emerging market economies increased in 
size as capital account and trade openness also increased during this period. Further openness of 
these economies as well as their growth, therefore, will contribute to additional payments to the 
multinational firms that establish operations in these countries. This future impact should be 
taken into account in assessing the efficacy of FDI. However, this need not be a negative aspect 
of FDI if it contributes to economic growth and employment in the host country.  
The predominance of FDI income payments will most likely continue. The World Bank 
(2018) reports that FDI is the largest source of external finance for developing countries, and 
over 40% of global FDI flows in 2016 were directed to developing countries. Moreover, FDI 
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income in the form of retained earnings can serve as the basis of further FDI inflows.14 The 
recent changes in the U.S. tax treatment of the profits of multinational firms will affect the 
decisions of U.S. based multinationals on the apportionment of retained versus repatriated 
earnings. 
Financial development also has an impact on investment income flows through portfolio 
income flows. The development of financial markets increases net income from these sources by 
lowering the payments on the liabilities. The protection of investors’ rights, on the other hand, 
increases these payments and the net income deficit from portfolio investments. Further research 
could separate the payments into those on stock versus those on bonds to examine how these 
may differ. 
One aspect of these income flows that merits further analysis is their possible impact on 
income inequality within the emerging markets. Furceri and Loungani (2015) and Bumann and 
Lensink (2016) have reported that capital account liberalization can increase income inequality. 
Harrison (2005) and Guerriero and Sen (2012) have shown that FDI inflows in particular lower 
labor’s share of income. The investment income payments on FDI liabilities may act as a channel 
of transmission that contributes to these findings. 
 Multinational firms are reassessing their investment strategies in the wake of a slowdown 
in international trade and the imposition of tariffs by the U.S. and China. However, flows of FDI 
continue to represent a significant source of external financing for emerging market economies, 
and future FDI will reflect the movement of production facilities to other parts of Asia. Our 
results indicate that FDI payments will remain as a source of future international investment 
income deficits for many emerging market economies. Moreover, if capital account and trade 
openness rise again as they did before the crisis, FDI payments will increase as well.  
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Notes 
1 The selection of countries was guided by the MSCI Emerging Markets Index, the FTSE 
Advanced and Secondary Emerging Markets Indexes, and the classification of countries used by 
Kose, Otrok and Prasad (2012). 
2 We included the inflation rate in the initial estimations but this variable was generally 
insignificant. 
3 See Svirydzenka (2016) for a description of these data. 
4 Aggarwal and Goodell (2009) examine the national attributes that lead to the development of 
equity markets and banking. Demirgüç-Kunt, Feyen and Levine (2013) describe how the relative 
importance of the two forms of finance—institutions vs. markets—changes as countries grow. 
5 Calderon and Kubota (2019) and Li, de Haan and Scholtens (2019) also use this methodology 
to deal with reverse causality. 
6 Baltagi, Griffin and Xiong (2000) support the use of pooled estimators to deal with 
heterogeneity. 
7 The yearly effects variables should account for the effect of global variables, such as world 
GDP growth. 
8 Damgaard and Elkjaer (2017) examine the role of special purpose entities in channeling FDI 
across borders.   
9 All correlations are available from the author. 
10 Crivelli, De Mooij and Keen (2016) report on profit shifting in developing economies. 
11 Reinvested earnings have been particularly important for U.S. FDI flows because of how the 
U.S. tax code dealt with foreign income. The recent change in the tax treatment of the foreign 
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profits of multinational enterprises will change this pattern. See UNCTAD (2018) for a 
discussion of the implications of the new tax system.    
12 The full results are available from the author. 
13 See our discussion of the research on this topic by Gourinchas, Rey and Govillot (2010) and 
Gourinchas, Rey and Truempler (2012) in Section 2. 
14 However, Hansen and Wagner (2018) point out that retained earnings can also be held in the 
host county as liquid assets. These could be repatriated rapidly if the multinationals become 
concerned about conditions in the host country. 
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Figure 1 
 
Direct Investment Assets/GDP, Portfolio Investment Assets/GDP,  
Other Investment Assets/GDP and Foreign Reserves/GDP 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
Domestic Investment Liabilities/GDP, Portfolio Investment Liabilities/GDP  
And Other Investment Liabilities/GDP 
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Figure 3 
 
Current Account/GDP, Balance of Trade/GDP, 
Net Primary Income/GDP and Net Secondary Income/GDP 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
 
Net Direct Investment Income/GDP, Net Portfolio Income/GDP, 
Net Other Investment Income/GDP and Reserves Income/GDP 
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Table 1 
 
Data and Sources 
 
Variable Source 
Assets/GDP, Liabilities/GDP (%) EWN 
Capital Openness Index (rescaled to 1-100) Chinn-Ito (2006) 
Direct Investment Assets/GDP,  
Direct Investment Liabilities/GDP (%) 
EWN 
Direct Investment Income Credits/GDP,  
Direct Investment Income Debits/GDP (%) 
BOPS, WDI 
Exchange Rate (Domestic currency value of dollar, average) IFS 
Financial Development, Financial Institutions,  
Financial Markets (scaled to 1-100) 
FDI 
Domestic GDP Growth (%) WDI 
GDP per capita (constant 2010 thousands of $) WDI 
Investment Income Credits/GDP,  
Investment Income Debits/GDP (%) 
BOPS 
Investment Profile (1 – 12) ICRG 
Law & Order (1 – 6) ICRG 
NIIP/GDP (Net International Investment Position/GDP) (%) EWN 
Net Direct Investment Income/GDP, Net Investment  
Income/GDP, Net Portfolio Investment Income/GDP,  
Net Other Investment Income/GDP (%) 
BOPS, WDI 
Other Investments Assets/GDP,  
Other Investment Liabilities/GDP (%) 
EWN 
Other Investment Credits/GDP,  
Other Investment Debits/GDP (%) 
BOPS, WDI 
Portfolio Investment (Equity + Debt) Assets/GDP,  
Portfolio Investment (Equity + Debt Liabilities/GDP (%) 
EWN 
Portfolio Investment (Equity + Debt) Income Credits/GDP,  
Portfolio Investment (Equity + Debt) Income Debits/GDP (%)  
BOPS, WDI 
Reserves/GDP (%) EWN 
Reserve Income/GDP (%) BOPS, WDI 
Trade Openness (Exports + Imports/GDP) (%) WDI 
 
Note: BOPS: Balance of Payments Statistics, IMF; EWN = External Wealth of Nations, Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2007); FDI = Financial Development Index Database, IMF; ICRG = 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS Group; WDI = World Development Indicators, World 
Bank 
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Table 2 
 
Net Investment Income/GDP 
 
 (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) 
NIIP/GDP 0.02***    
 (0.01)    
Assets/GDP  0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Liabilities/GDP  -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
GDP Growth -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
∆ Ln(Exchange Rate) -0.64 -0.50 -0.49 -0.49 
 (0.42) (0.46) (0.47) (0.45) 
GDP Per Capita -0.17* -0.13 -0.07 -0.04 
 (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) 
Capital Openness  -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Trade Openness  -0.02** -0.02** -0.02*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Financial Development  0.02*   
  (0.01)   
Financial Institutions   -0.01 -0.01 
   (0.02) (0.02) 
Financial Markets   0.01 0.01 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
Law & Order    0.15 
    (0.15) 
Investment Profile    -0.05 
    (0.06) 
Constant -1.29 -1.48* -1.33 -1.91* 
 (0.81) (0.89) (0.88) (1.15) 
R2 0.61 0.64 0.64 0.68 
N 487 487 487 478 
 
Note: All variables are lagged. Country and time fixed effects are also included. The symbols *, 
**, *** denote statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 3 
 
Net Foreign Direct Investment Income/GDP 
 
 (3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) 
Net Direct Inv/GDP 0.03***    
 (0.01)    
Direct Inv Assets/GDP  0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Direct Inv Liabilities/GDP  -0.02** -0.02*** -0.02** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
GDP Growth -0.02 -0.03* -0.02 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
∆ Ln(Exchange Rate) -0.33 -0.36 -0.36 -0.36 
 (0.31) (0.35) (0.34) (0.34) 
GDP Per Capita -0.00 0.10 0.08 0.07 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) 
Capital Openness  -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Trade Openness  -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Financial Development  0.01   
  (0.01)   
Financial Institutions   0.01 0.01 
   (0.02) (0.02) 
Financial Markets   0.00 -0.00 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
Law & Order    0.16 
    (0.11) 
Investment Profile    0.03 
    (0.04) 
Constant -0.22 -0.27 -0.22 -0.65 
 (0.62) (0.70) (0.70) (0.88) 
R2 0.50 0.61 0.60 0.67 
N 463 463 463 454 
 
Note: All variables are lagged. Country fixed effects are also included. The symbols *, **, *** 
denote statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 4 
 
Net Portfolio Investment Income/GDP 
 
 (4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) 
Net Portfolio Inv/GDP 0.02***    
 (0.00)    
Portfolio Inv Assets/GDP  0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Portfolio Inv Liabilities/GDP  -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GDP Growth 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
∆ Ln(Exchange Rate) 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.03 
 (0.22) (0.24) (0.25) (0.23) 
GDP Per Capita 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Capital Openness  0.00 0.00 0.00* 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Trade Openness  0.00* 0.00 -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Financial Development  0.01**   
  (0.01)   
Financial Institutions   0.01 0.01* 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
Financial Markets   0.01** 0.01** 
   (0.00) (0.00) 
Law & Order    -0.12 
    (0.07) 
Investment Profile    -0.03* 
    (0.02) 
Constant -1.61** -1.83*** -1.82*** -1.69*** 
 (0.67) (0.64) (0.58) (0.64) 
R2 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.52 
N 444 444 444 435 
 
Note: All variables are lagged. Country and time fixed effects are also included. The symbols *, 
**, *** denote statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 5 
 
Net Other Investment Income/GDP 
 
 (5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) 
Net Other Inv/GDP 0.02***    
 (0.00)    
Other Inv Assets/GDP  0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Other Inv Liabilities/GDP  -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GDP Growth 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
∆ Ln(Exchange Rate) -0.14 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) 
GDP/Per Capita -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.14*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Capital Openness  0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Trade Openness  -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Financial Development  0.00   
  (0.01)   
Financial Institutions   0.00 -0.00 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
Financial Markets   0.00 0.00 
   (0.00) (0.00) 
Law & Order    0.09 
    (0.07) 
Investment Profile    -0.03 
    (0.03) 
Constant 0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.29 
 (0.43) (0.38) (0.40) (0.49) 
R2 0.70 0.66 0.66 0.65 
N 454 454 454 445 
 
Note: All variables are lagged. Country and time effects are also included. The symbols *, **, 
*** denote statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 6 
 
Total Investment Income Credits/GDP, Direct Investment Income Credits/GDP,  
Portfolio Investment Credits/GDP, Other Investment Income Credits/GDP 
 
 (6.1) (6.2) (963) (6.4) 
 Inv Inc 
Credits/GDP 
Direct Inv Inc 
Credits/GDP 
Portfolio Inv Inc 
Credits/GDP 
Other Inv Inc 
Credits/GDP 
Asset/GDP 0.03***    
 (0.00)    
Direct Inv Assets/GDP  0.04***   
  (0.01)   
Portfolio Inv Assets/GDP   0.02***  
   (0.00)  
Other Inv Assets/GDP    0.01*** 
    (0.00) 
∆ Ln(Exchange Rate) -0.01 0.14 0.19*** -0.16 
 (0.21) (0.11) (0.06) (0.13) 
GDP Per Capita 0.17*** 0.11*** 0.01 0.06** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
Capital Openness 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Trade Openness -0.01*** -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Financial Institutions 0.01 0.00 -0.01*** 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Financial Markets 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Law & Order 0.17** -0.01 0.05** 0.15*** 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04) 
Investment Profile 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Constant -1.76*** -1.00*** -0.04 -0.16 
 (0.42) (0.31) (0.16) (0.32) 
R2 0.81 0.76 0.56 0.67 
N 478 454 436 446 
 
Note: The dependent variables are reported above the columns. All independent variables are 
lagged. Country and time fixed effects are also included. The symbols *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 7 
 
Total Investment Income Debits/GDP, Direct Investment Income Debits/GDP,  
Portfolio Investment Debits/GDP, Other Investment Income Debits/GDP 
  
 (7.1) (7.2) (7.3) (7.4) 
 Inv Inc 
Debits/GDP 
Direct Inv Inc 
Debits/GDP 
Portfolio Inv 
Inc Debits/GDP 
Other Inv Inc 
Debits/GDP 
Liabilities/GDP 0.03***    
 (0.00)    
Direct Inv Liabilities/GDP  0.03***   
  (0.01)   
Portfolio Inv Liabilities/GDP   0.02***  
   (0.00)  
Other Inv Liabilities/GDP    0.03*** 
    (0.00) 
GDP Growth 0.01 0.03* -0.01* -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
∆ Ln (Exchange Rate) 0.55 0.41 0.24 0.02 
 (0.53) (0.36) (0.28) (0.31) 
GDP Per Capita 0.13 0.02 -0.01 0.17*** 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.02) (0.03) 
Capital Openness 0.01** 0.02*** -0.00 -0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Trade Openness 0.01* 0.01** -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Financial Institutions 0.02 -0.01 -0.01** 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Financial Markets 0.00 0.01 -0.01** -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Law & Order -0.01 -0.15 0.17*** 0.04 
 (0.14) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) 
Investment Profile 0.04 -0.05 0.04** 0.01 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) 
Constant 0.95 -0.11 1.58*** 0.29 
 (1.10) (0.96) (0.54) (0.37) 
R2 0.81 0.77 0.69 0.78 
N 478 458 438 445 
 
Note: The dependent variables are reported above the columns. All independent variables are 
lagged. Country and time fixed effects are also included. The symbols *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 8 
 
Total Investment Income Credits/GDP with Direct Investment Assets/GDP,  
Portfolio Investment Assets/GDP and Other Investment Assets/GDP 
 
 (8.1) (8.2) (8.3) (8.4) 
Direct Inv Assets/GDP 0.04***   0.04*** 
 (0.01)   (0.01) 
Portfolio Inv Assets/GDP  0.04***  0.03*** 
  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Other Inv Assets/GDP   0.01** 0.01** 
   (0.00) (0.00) 
∆ Ln (Exchange Rate) 0.18 0.11 0.17 0.20 
 (0.18) (0.21) (0.21) (0.19) 
GDP/Per Capita 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.14*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Capital Openness -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Trade Openness -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Financial Institutions 0.02** 0.02* 0.02** 0.01* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Financial Markets 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Law & Order 0.08 0.08 0.14* 0.11 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) 
Investment Profile -0.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant -0.52   -0.77* 
 (0.45)   (0.43) 
R2 0.79 0.61 0.57 0.82 
N 478 477 477 477 
 
Note: All independent variables are lagged. Country fixed and time effects are also included. The 
symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
  
 36 
Table 9 
 
Total Investment Income Debits/GDP with Direct Investment Liabilities/GDP,  
Portfolio Investment Liabilities/GDP and Other Investment Liabilities/GDP 
 
 (9.1) (9.2) (9.3) (9.4) 
Direct Inv Liabilities/GDP 0.04***   0.03*** 
 (0.01)   (0.01) 
Portfolio Inv Liabilities/GDP  0.00  -0.02 
  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Other Inv Liabilities/GDP   0.03*** 0.03*** 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
GDP Growth -0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
∆ Ln (Exchange Rate) 0.93* 0.94* 0.72 0.77 
 (0.53) (0.55) (0.54) (0.52) 
GDP/Per Capita 0.24** 0.21* 0.03 0.10 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) 
Capital Openness 0.01** 0.02*** 0.01** 0.01* 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Trade Openness 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Financial Institutions 0.03 0.04* 0.01 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Financial Markets -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Law & Order -0.04 -0.02 0.09 0.06 
 (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.14) 
Investment Profile -0.01 0.00 0.07 0.05 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Constant 0.98 0.57 1.24 1.38 
 (1.15) (1.26) (1.22) (1.12) 
R2 0.81 0.74 0.76 0.81 
N 478 477 477 477 
 
Note: All independent variables are lagged. Country and time fixed effects are also included. The 
symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 10 
 
Net Direct Investment Income/GDP, Net Portfolio Investment Income/GDP, Net Other 
Investment Income/GDP: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions 
 
 (10.1) (10.2) (10.3) 
 Net Dir Inv 
Inc/GDP 
Net Port Inv 
Inc/GDP 
Net Oth Inv 
Inc/GDP 
Direct Inv Assets/GDP 0.03***   
 (0.01)   
Direct Inv Liabilities/GDP -0.01   
 (0.01)   
Portfolio Inv Assets/GDP  0.01***  
  (0.00)  
Portfolio Inv Liabilities/GDP  -0.03***  
  (0.00)  
Other Inv Assets/GDP   0.02*** 
   (0.00) 
Other Inv Liabilities/GDP   -0.03*** 
   (0.00) 
GDP Growth -0.05*** 0.02*** 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
∆ Ln (Exchange Rate) -0.70 -0.63*** -0.21 
 (0.45) (0.24) (0.22) 
GDP/Per Capita 0.18*** 0.06** -0.14*** 
 (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) 
Capital Openness -0.02*** -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Trade Openness -0.02*** -0.00 0.01** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Financial Institutions -0.01 -0.00 0.01** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Financial Markets 0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Law & Order 0.16 -0.10** 0.16*** 
 (0.11) (0.05) (0.05) 
Investment Profile 0.08 0.00 0.02 
 (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant -0.95 -2.21*** -1.34*** 
 (0.68) (0.40) (0.36) 
R2 0.75 0.67 0.74 
N 454 434 445 
 
Note: The dependent variables are reported above the columns. All independent variables are 
lagged. Country and time fixed effects are also included. The symbols *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table A1 
 
Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Standard Dev 
Assets/GDP 53.01 5.52 256.43 37.74 
Capital Openness 53.09 0.00 100.00 15.66 
Direct Inv Assets/GDP 10.98 0.00 187.40 23.03 
Direct Inv Income Credits/GDP 0.49 -0.24 10.74 1.12 
Direct Inv Income Debits/GDP 2.48 -5.39 14.99 2.60 
Direct Inv Liabilities/GDP 32.46 2.15 245.69 31.63 
∆ Ln(Exchange Rate) 0.05 -0.33 1.23 0.15 
Financial Development 39.99 10.00 86.00 14.26 
Financial Institutions 43.19 15.00 82.00 15.21 
Financial Markets 35.91 3.00 89.00 10.02 
Domestic Income Growth 4.16 -14.81 18.29 3.99 
GDP Per Capita 7.94 0.62 24.97 5.09 
Inv Income Credits/GDP 1.60 0.06 12.20 1.42 
Inv Income Debits/GDP 4.38 -1.02 18.50 2.81 
Investor Profile 8.21 2.42 12.00 2.09 
Law & Order 3.60 1.00 6.00 1.11 
Liabilities/GDP 83.44 26.24 381.01 50.76 
Net Direct Inv Income/GDP -1.99 -12.38 5.27 2.00 
Net Inv Income/GDP -2.77 -12.11 3.16 2.08 
NIIP/GDP -0.30 -1.60 0.61 0.29 
Net Portfolio Inv Income/GDP -0.55 -5.85 1.31 0.71 
Net Other Inv Income/GDP -0.48 -4.87 2.69 0.98 
Other Inv Assets/GDP 17.10 1.27 96.49 16.54 
Other Inv Credits/GDP 0.77 0.00 5.71 0.80 
Other Inv Debits/GDP 1.26 0.15 6.87 1.13 
Other Inv Liabilities/GDP 32.03 4.40 148.51 24.80 
Portfolio Inv Assets/GDP 7.01 0.02 57.07 9.55 
Portfolio Inv Credits/GDP 0.32 0.00 1.56 0.34 
Portfolio Inv Debits/GDP 0.86 0.00 5.94 0.73 
Portfolio Liabilities/GDP 17.79 0.20 66.37 21.21 
Reserves/GDP 17.16 0.64 50.95 10.72 
Reserves Income/GDP 0.30 0.00 1.32 0.29 
Trade Openness 75.06 15.64 220.41 43.09 
 
 
